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NOTES AND COMMENTS
as a bailment. The most approved distinction is that a conditional
sale contemplates passage of title to the vendee and payment of the
price by him, while a bailment contemplates that title shall remain in
the bailor and that the property shall be returned to him."1 Seem-
ingly the contract in the present case falls under the concept of a
conditional sale. The provision that the finance company may de-
mand possession before default does not prevent a conditional sale
from resulting.' 2 However, in practically all cases where an osten-
sible bailment was held a conditional sale the possessor had the right
of use or disposal of the property to some extent, while in the prin-
cipal case the possession of the dealer was limited to storage. Nev-
ertheless, many courts have held certain trust receipt agreements in
which the vendor retains title and the vendee holds the property in
trust for storage only to be in effect conditional sales.'
3
The bailment in the principal case seems colorable. The clear
intent of the parties appears to be that the claimant should not demand
possession unless the dealer defaulted in payment. The facts present
an especially deceptive situation, since the cars are the very ones over
which the dealer has formerly exercised control by selling to cus-
tomers. Good policy demands recordation of such agreements.
J. A. KLEEMEIER, JR.
Workmen's Compensation-Subrogation-Defenses Available
to Negligent Third Parties.
While driving a truck of X Company across the defendant's rail-
road track, an employee of the company was killed by a train. While
'Morris v. Boston Music Co., 129 Minn. 198, 151 N. W. 971 (1917).; Ver-
mont Acceptance Corp. v. Wiltshire, 103 Vt. 219, 153 At. 199 (1931).
' Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Lawson, 237 Fed. 877 (S. D.
Iowa 1916) ; In -re Shiffert, 281 Fed. 284 (E. D. Pa. 1922). Certainly a right
in the finance company to demand possession before default would not prevent
a conditional sale under a dictum of the North Carolina court giving any
conditional vendor such a right. See State v. Stinett, 203 N. C. 829, 167 S. E.
63 (1933) criticised in (1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 321.
" In re Cullen, 282 Fed. 902 (D.Md. 1922); Commonwealth Finance Co. v.
Schutt, 97 N. J. L. 225, 116 Atl. 722 (1922).
However, a tripartite trust receipt agreement, in which the vendee was to
hold for storage, was not to use or dispose of cars, and was to deliver to
finance company on demand was held merely a bailment. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 202 N. W. 627 (1925). In In re Otto-
Johnson Mercantile Co., 52 F. (2d) 678 (D. N. M. 1928) the court held a
similar agreement to be a bailment intimating it could not be a conditional sale
because the manufacturer was the real dealer. In Hanna, Trut Receipts
(1929) 29 CoL L. RPv. 545 it is noted that some courts regard the trust receipt
as sui generis. See (1931) 9 N. C. L. Rsv. 468.
74 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
an action by the deceased's administrator was pending, an award was
made under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The complaint was
then amended so as to make the X Company a real party in interest.
The defendant set up the contributory negligence of X Company in
allowing its employee to use a truck with defective brakes. Held:
Valid defense.1
As the Workmen's Compensation Acts are never exactly alike in
any two states, the jurisdictions differ materially on the question of
who has the right to bring an action against a third party whose
negligence has caused the injury or death of an employee operating
under the Act. Most of them, however, may be placed within one
of the following categories: (1) Those in which there is a statutory
provision to the effect that, if the negligent third party is operating
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, his liability is limited to
the amount of the award specified in the Act, and the employer or
his insurance carrier 'has the exclusive right to maintain an action
against the third party for injury to or death of an employee. 2 (2)
Those in which the action may be maintained either by the employer
or the employee.8 (3) Those in which the employee has the option
of maintaining an action against the third party or against the em-
ployer; but if he elects to do the latter and an award is made, he is
considered to have given up his right to sue the third party. 4 North
Carolina adopts the latter view, and the employee, or his represent-
ative, is privileged to begin both actions at once, with the employer
being subrogated to the rights of the employee, or his representative,
after an award has been made.5 It has been held that if the em-
ployer fails to take advantage of his right of subrogation, the em-
ployee, or his representative, may sue the third person.6
When the employer does exercise his right, it is held, with the
exception of a few cases, 7 that his concurring negligence is not a
1Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 N. C. 668, 169 S. E. 419 (1933).2 Wendt & Crane Co. v. Traff, 262 IIl. App. 58 (1931).
'McKenzie v. Mo. Stables, 327 Mo. 88, 34 S. W. (2d) 136 (1930).
"Holmes v. Henry Jennings & Sons, 7 Fed. (2d) 231 (D. C. 1921); State
v. Francis, 150 Md. 285, 134 Atl. 26 (1926).
Phifer v. Berry, 202 N. C. 388, 163 S. E. 119 (1932); Prigden & U. S.
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Ry. & Carolina Delivery Service, 203 N. C. 62, 164
S. E. 325 (1932) ; McCarley v. Council and Sutton 205 N. C. 370, 171 S. E. 323
(1933).
6 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Palmer, 149 Va. 560, 140 S. E. 831 (1927).
7 Thornton v. Reese, 246 N. W. 527 (Minn. 1933); Corey & Son, Lt'd. v.
France, Fenwick & Co., Lt'd. (1911) 1 K. B. 114; Canadian P. R. Co. v. Alberta
Clay Products, Lt'd., 8 B. W. C. C. 675 (Can. 1914) (cited and distinguished in
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valid defense.8 This result is reached through the following process
of reasoning: (1) No exceptions are made in the statutes to the rule
that for the purpose of this suit the employer is subrogated to every
right of the employee, or his representative.9 (2) As the right of the
employee, or his representative, to compensation exists solely because
of the Workmen's Compensation Act and not because of the neg-
ligence of the employer, the latter should not be precluded from a
recovery against a negligent third person by his own contributony
negligence. 10 (3) As evidence of the amount of compensation paid is
not admissible in the third party action, it is impossible to measure
the effect of the employer's contributory negligence. 1 The cases in
the United States holding that the defense is available to the third
party maintain that the statutes providing for subrogation do not
contemplate a situation in which the employer's negligence contrib-
uted to the injury. The actual rights of the employee, or his repre-
sentative, are transferred to the employer only when his hands are
clean.12 In view of the fact that not one of the statutes makes
exception to the rule that the employer is subrogated to the rights of
an employee, or his representative, it would seem that the holding of
the principal case is fallacious.
Following the reasoning of the majority holding, it has been held
that the statute of limitations begins running on the employer's right
of action from the time of the injury.13 As the North Carolina
statute provides that the employer may institute action before pay-
ment of an award in order to protect the loss of his rights by the
Milosevich et. al. v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 68 Cal. App. 662, 230 Pac. 15
(1924).
8 Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller & Paine, 240 Fed. 376 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917);
Milosevich et. at. v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., spra note 7; Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Cedar Valley Electric Co., 187 Ia. 1014, 174 N. W. 709 (1919); City of
Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 145 La. 679, 82 So. 785
(1919); General Box Co. v. Mo. Utilities Co., 55 S. W. (2d) 442 (Mo.
1932) ; Graham v. City of Lincoln et at., 106 Neb. 305, 183 N. W. 569 (1921).
9 General Box Co. v. Mo. Utilities Co., supra note 8.
See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Cedar Valley Electric Co., supra note 8, at
1019 ("A discussion of the right of one joint tort-feasor to contribution from
another, or of the right of one injured person, who has recovered judgment
against, made settlement with, one joint tort-feasor to recover against another,
is not germane to the question.").
"Milosevich et al. v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., supra note 7.
"Thornton Bros. v. Reese, supra note 7; Brown v. So. Ry., supra note 1.
"Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Indianapolis & Cinc. Traction Co.,
195 Ind. 91, 142 N. E. 856 (1924) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ladd, 121 Kan.
659, 249 Pac. 687 (1926) ; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Blue Diamond Coal
Co., 170 S. E. 728 (Va. 1933) ; Contra: Star Brewing Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. &
St. L. Ry. Co., 275 Fed. 330 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921).
76 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
passage of time,' 4 it is reasonable to infer that we would adopt this
view. It is generally conceded that as agairist the employer the third
party can not avail himself of the defense that a settlement has been
made with the employee, unless the employer has consented theretoY15
Since he is considered to stand in the position of the employee as
against a third party,16 any defense which would be available to the
third party in an action by the employee, or his representative, is valid
when the employer brings the action.
17
EmmETT C. WILLIS, JR.
1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1081(r).
5Pizcz v. Schultz et. al., 236 App. Div. 552, 261 N. Y. S. 198 (1932);
Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., 288 Pa. 85, 135 Atl. 558 (1927). Contra: Gones v.
Fisher, 286 Ill. 606, 122 N. E. 94 (1919) (on the grounds that there being only
one cause of action, any settlement will destroy it).
' General Box Co. v. Mo. Utilities Co., supra note 8.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ladd, mspra note 13; (1933) 33 Cor. L. REv.
550.
